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Court Ordered Cesarean Sections: Why Courts Should Not Be 
Allowed to Use a Balancing Test 
“MacDuff was from his mother’s womb, Untimely ripped.” ~ MacBeth, Act V, 
Scene vii 
ERIN P. DAVENPORT* 
ABSTRACT 
Many women nowadays give birth via cesarean section, and most of the time, both 
the doctors and the women are in agreement regarding the use of this procedure.  Some 
women, however, refuse to undergo this procedure, and their doctors may try to obtain a 
court order to perform a cesarean section.  This Article advances the argument that 
courts should not use a balancing test when determining whether a woman should be 
compelled to undergo a cesarean section.  This argument is based on the right to privacy, 
which arises from abortion cases and informed consent situations, and on the common 
law idea that a person usually has no duty to rescue another.  It analyzes the compelling 
interests and considerations presented by the state when it seeks court-ordered treatment 
and considers four cases that have addressed the issue of court-ordered cesarean sections.  
Although these situations are difficult to resolve and often occur in time-strapped 
situations, women should be allowed to make their own decisions regarding the delivery 
of their children.  Additionally, discussions regarding various delivery options should 
occur sooner rather than later in the pregnancy to avoid situations in which the women 
and their doctors transform from a cooperative team to battling adversaries. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
A person enters a burning building and must choose between saving a 
family member or a complete stranger.  Most people would likely save the 
family member due to the familial bond.  Doctors, more specifically 
obstetricians, often find themselves in a similar situation with pregnant patients.  
Do they treat the woman, the fetus, or both?  Pregnancy creates a unique 
situation for doctors because to treat the fetus, the doctor must treat the woman.  
Often, women willingly undergo a treatment because doctors believe that the 
fetus receives the treatment’s benefits.  What happens if a woman refuses a 
treatment that benefits the fetus?  Doctors encounter the same quandary as the 
person in the hypothetical burning building.  Should doctors honor the woman’s 
refusal, or should they seek a court order to compel treatment?  If the doctor 
opts for judicial intervention, then the fetus often prevails over the woman 
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because the courts balance the fetus’s rights against the woman’s rights.  Courts, 
however, should not conduct a balancing test, especially with procedures like 
cesarean sections.  The court-ordered procedure undercuts the woman’s 
constitutional rights and makes her a glorified incubator, which courts may 
open at their leisure.  The balancing test sets women’s rights back centuries 
because courts may unconsciously (or perhaps consciously) make value 
judgments on the situation.  The courts may skew established law because the 
woman only contests the method of delivery. 
II. CESAREAN BACKGROUND 
Since ancient times, people have known and used the cesarean section.  
Myths, legends, and Shakespearean plays have all referred to the surgery.1  
Cesarean sections occurred in Egypt in 3,000 B.C., as well as other countries like 
Greece, Italy, and Persia.2  Unlike today, doctors considered cesarean sections as 
the final delivery option because the woman was often dead or dying after the 
completed procedure.3  Until the sixteenth century, doctors performed cesarean 
sections postmortem, but at the time live women began to undergo the 
procedure as well.4  Women who chose to undergo the procedure had a high 
risk of death.5  Doctors did not opt for this delivery method with a live woman 
“unless [she] had been in labor for a very long time and was unable to deliver 
vaginally” because of the high mortality rates from hemorrhaging and 
infection.6  Cesarean sections, however, became routine after the Catholic 
Church mandated that doctors perform these procedures to save children for the 
purpose of baptism.7 
The cesarean section gradually shifted from a final, last resort option to 
another delivery method between the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.8  The procedure’s mortality rates dropped with three surgical 
developments: “adoption of the use of uterine sutures to arrest hemorrhage, the 
adoption of aseptic technique, and changes in operative technique from the 
classical to lower-segment operations.”9  These developments made the cesarean 
section safer and caused mortality rates to decline.  By the mid-twentieth 
 
 1. See MORTIMER ROSEN & LILLIAN THOMAS, THE CESAREAN MYTH 13 (1989).  Some historical 
figures may have been born via cesarean section:  Gorgias of Sicily, Robert II of Scotland, Andrea 
Doria, the Genovese admiral; Pope Gregory XIV, and Bishop Paulus of Spain.  Vern L. Katz & Robert 
C. Cefalo, History and Evolution of Cesarean Delivery, in CESAREAN DELIVERY 1, 3 (Jeffrey P. Phelan & 
Steven L. Clark eds., 1988). 
 2. See ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 13. 
 3. See id. at 13-14. 
 4. See Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 4. 
 5. See id. (noting that three women underwent a cesarean section, but only one survived). 
 6. Id.  Even in the Renaissance, scholars had heated ethical debates on the use of cesarean 
sections.  Id. at 4-5. 
 7. See id. at 5. 
 8. See id.; ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15. 
 9. Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 5.  Classical operations involve vertical cuts from the belly 
button to the bikini line, while lower segment operations involve horizontal cuts at the bikini line.  
ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
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century, cesarean sections accounted for “about four percent of all births.”10  
With the decline in maternal mortality during the 1930s and 1940s, doctors 
created more reasons to perform the cesarean section, like the baby’s safety and 
a mother’s history of previous cesarean sections.11 
In today’s society, people often consider the cesarean section as a 
frequently performed “low risk procedure,” and doctors have created more 
cesarean section indicators thanks to fetal technology advances.12  These 
indicators include medical and legal reasons, as well as convenience and 
monetary factors.13  Cesarean sections, however, mainly occur if the fetus 
appears to be in breech, dystocia, or fetal distress.14  Doctors also have non-
medical reasons for performing cesarean sections, like lack of experience with 
vaginal births, possible lawsuits for not performing a cesarean section,15 
convenience in the delivery schedule, and differences in insurance coverage.16 
While doctors often perform cesarean sections for “legitimate” medical 
reasons, the procedure is still major surgery.  The woman receives a form of 
anesthesia before the doctor begins the incisions.17  The doctor cuts through 
skin, fat, muscle, tissue, the peritoneum, and uterus before cutting the amniotic 
membrane and removing the baby.18  The doctor then removes the placenta, 
closes the incisions, and places about seven sets of stitches into the woman’s 
body.19 
Even with a “successful delivery,” the woman is not out of danger.  The 
surgery poses mortality risks to the mother and the fetus, which is often four 
times higher than the vaginal birth.20  In spite of this risk, the cesarean section is 
one of the most commonly performed medical procedures.21  In 2004, 29.1% of 
all childbirths occurred by cesarean section, which is the highest rate ever 
 
 10. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15. 
 11. Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
 12. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15; see also Norbert Gleicher et al., Methods for Safe 
Reduction of Cesarean Section Rates, in CESAREAN SECTION: GUIDELINES FOR APPROPRIATE UTILIZATION 
141, 143 (Bruce L. Flamm & Edward J. Quilligan eds., 1995) (stating that the cesarean section is the 
most frequently performed surgical procedure in the United States). 
 13. Bruce L. Flamm, Cesarean Delivery in the United States: A Summary of the Past 20 Years, in 
CESAREAN SECTION, supra note 12, at 1, 6. 
 14. See, e.g., ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 23-39 (explaining the various cesarean section 
indicators).  Other medical factors indicate a cesarean section like postdate pregnancy, premature 
rupture of the membrane, placenta previa, and various mother-related illnesses.  See id. at 45. 
 15. Id. at 56. 
 16. See Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 142-43; see also Flamm, supra note 13, at 6 (listing the 
doctors’ reasons for performing cesarean sections); ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 56 (listing the 
doctors’ reasons for performing cesarean sections with the supporting rationales). 
 17. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18-19.  Women can choose from three types of anesthesia: 
spinal, epidural, or general.  Id. 
 18. Id. at 19-20.  Prior to cutting the amniotic membrane, the woman has lost about 150 
centiliters of blood.  Id. at 20. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 63.  Women have a mortality rate of “35.9 deaths per 100,000,” and infants have a 
mortality rate of “9.2 per 100,000.”  Daniel R. Levy, The Maternal-Fetal Conflict:  The Right of a Woman 
to Refuse a Cesarean Section Versus the State’s Interest in Saving the Life of the Fetus, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 
97, 99 (2005). 
 21. See Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 143. 
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reported in the United States, and shows an increase from 27.5% in 2003.22  The 
rate of cesarean sections, however, shows no signs of decreasing.  First-time 
cesarean section rates have increased from 19.1% in 2003 to approximately 23.4% 
in 2007 while vaginal birth after cesarean (VBAC) rates have decreased from 
10.6% in 2003 to approximately 8.0% in 2007.23  The possibility of fetal injury also 
does not appear to be a deterrent.  During a cesarean section, fetuses have a 1.1% 
chance of injury with the most common injury being skin lacerations.24 
Doctors consider all of these factors in their decision about whether a 
woman needs a cesarean section.  While doctors share the goal of “the birth of a 
perfect baby to a healthy mother,”25 they may have other concerns that affect the 
decision.26  Women, however, have become more educated about the procedure 
for their own edification and due to increased media focus on the issue.27  With 
this information and knowledge, women may refuse the procedure.  Thus, a 
pregnancy power struggle could result in which the doctor wants to perform a 
procedure that the woman does not want.  Unlike a normal doctor-patient 
relationship, this decision affects an unborn third party.  Thus, the courts may be 
required to resolve the situation, which may cause the woman’s rights to be 
completely subordinated to the fetus’s rights. 
III. CESAREAN CASES 
When most people think of the courts and reproductive rights, they 
automatically conclude that the issue is abortion.  Cesarean sections, however, 
have also created controversy.  These controversies rarely proceed past the trial 
court, and the rulings are often not published.  Thus, cases do not consistently 
reach the appellate level, and many courts may not have addressed the issue.  
As a result, while these courts reach different conclusions in their cases, the 
conclusions fall into two camps: pro-women and pro-fetus. 
 
 22. Joyce A. Martin, et al., Preliminary Births for 2004:  Infant and Maternal Health, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/prelimbirths04/      
prelimbirths04health.htm  (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (noting that 29.1% translates into about 1.2 
million births); Fastats – Birth – Method of Delivery, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/delivery.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 23. Martin, supra note 22; Fastats – Obstetrical Procedures, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/obgyn.htm  (last visited Oct. 13, 2010); QuickStats:  Total and 
Primary Cesarean Rate and Vaginal Birth after Previous Cesarean (VBAC) Rate – United States, 1989-2003, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/  
mm5402a5.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 24. Risk Factors for Fetal Injury During C-section Identified, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2006. 
 25. Bruce L. Flamm, Introduction to CESAREAN SECTION, supra note 13, at xv, xvi. 
 26. Mary Beth Pfeiffer, C-section Rates Tick Upward as Doctors Fear Being Sued, POUGHKEEPSIE 
JOURNAL, May 9, 2010, http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/article/20100509/NEWS01/ 
5090346/C-section-rates-tick-upward-as-doctors-fear-being-sued (noting that several factors 
including previous cesarean sections, liability issues, the birth of multiple children at once, induced 
labor, misread signs of fetal distress, and convenience have led to more cesarean sections). 
 27. See Flamm, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
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A. Pro-Women 
i. Illinois v. Mother Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe)28 
The Illinois Appellate Court placed itself staunchly in the pro-women 
camp.  Mother Doe received treatment at a Chicago hospital during her 
pregnancy.29  During a visit, Dr. Meserow, a board-certified OB/GYN affiliated 
with the hospital, examined her.30  After some tests, he recommended a cesarean 
section or induced labor, which she refused on religious grounds.31  Even with 
an examination two weeks later, she still refused the recommended procedures, 
and the hospital sought appointment as the fetus’s custodian.32  After a second 
medical opinion and a judicial hearing, the court denied the petition.33 
Even though the issue was resolved with the baby’s birth, the parties 
appealed to settle the issue of compelled treatment because the situation could 
occur again.34  The court did not address the earlier jurisdictional issue and 
focused on whether the circuit court “should have balanced the rights of the 
unborn but viable fetus . . . against the right of a competent woman to choose 
the type of medical care she deemed appropriate . . . .”35  The court rejected a 
balancing test, holding that a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical 
treatment involving her pregnancy “must be honored, even in circumstances 
where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.”36 
The court based its decision on the past precedent of Stallman v. 
Youngquist37 and a person’s right to refuse treatment.38  The court also 
considered the uniqueness of pregnancy for women; even with pregnancy, a 
woman can refuse lifesaving or invasive treatment as she can without a 
pregnancy.39  The court did not think that a “woman’s rights can be 
subordinated to fetal rights.”40  While the court analyzed the four state 
countervailing interests, these interests did not override a woman’s refusal.41  
Thus, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that courts should honor a 
woman’s choice and not use a balancing test. 
 
 28. 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 29. Id. at 326. 
 30. Id. at 326-27. 
 31. Id. at 327. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 328.  A jurisdictional issue created some complications, and the appellate court 
suggested that the Juvenile Court Act was inapplicable.  Id.  The circuit court agreed, and the state 
filed an amended version of its petition.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 329-30.  Mother Doe vaginally delivered a healthy baby boy after the court denied the 
state’s petition.  Id. at 329. 
 35. Id. at 330. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
 38. Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 330-31. 
 39. Id. at 332. 
 40. Id. (citing Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361). 
 41. Id. at 334. 
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ii. In re A.C.42 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also joined the pro-women 
camp, but, due to the case’s complexity, not as definitively as the Illinois 
Appellate Court.  A.C. was a married, twenty-seven year old woman in 
remission from cancer.43  During her pregnancy’s twenty-fifth week, George 
Washington University Hospital discovered an inoperable tumor in her lung.44  
After discussing some options, A.C. had not decided whether she still wanted to 
give birth, and the hospital requested a declaratory judgment to deliver the 
fetus.45  A dispute arose over whether A.C. consented to a cesarean section 
before twenty-eight weeks, and after several doctors’ testimony, the court 
ordered a cesarean section.46  When A.C. regained consciousness from her heavy 
sedation, doctors informed her of the order, but she appeared not to consent.47  
The court reconvened but still ordered the cesarean section.48 
Like In re Baby Boy Doe, this appeal addressed the issue after doctors 
performed the procedure because the situation could occur again.  The court 
analyzed the issue under two standards.  First, the court addressed a person’s 
right to refuse treatment based on bodily integrity.49  The court acknowledged 
that it could not “compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his 
or her bodily integrity for the benefit of another person’s health.”50  The court 
also dismissed the idea that pregnant women should be held to a different 
standard due to their pregnancies.  The court did not believe that a fetus had 
rights “superior to those of a person who has already been born.”51  The court 
acknowledged that the right to refuse treatment did not exist exclusively in the 
common law and had “constitutional magnitude.”52  Second, because A.C. 
appeared incompetent at the time, the court thought that the trial judge should 
have used substituted judgment to reach a decision.53  To determine A.C.’s 
decision, the court should have considered her wishes, along with her treatment 
directions to family or friends.54 
Thus, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that the trial 
court should not have used a balancing test to reach its decision.55  The court, 
 
 42. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 43. Id. at 1238. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1239. 
 46. Id. at 1239-40. 
 47. Id. at 1240-41.  The hospital department thought that the family’s wishes should be honored.  
Id. at 1240. 
 48. Id. at 1240-41.  The judge relied on the District of Columbia’s only decision on the issue, In re 
Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 2, 1986).  A.C.’s baby died a few hours 
after the surgery, and A.C. died two days later.  In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1241. 
 49. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243. 
 50. Id. at 1243-44.  The court also examined the four countervailing state interests, but these 
factors were quickly dismissed.  Id. at 1245-49. 
 51. Id. at 1244. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1249. 
 54. Id. at 1250-51. 
 55. Id. at 1247. 
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however, did not hold that a woman’s refusal was absolute, because a situation 
involving “truly extraordinary or compelling reasons” might override her 
decision.56 
B. Pro-Fetus 
i. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc.57 
The United States District Court of Northern Florida joined the pro-fetus 
camp in 1999.  In her second pregnancy, Ms. Pemberton wanted a vaginal 
birth.58  Because doctors refused to perform a vaginal birth, she decided on a 
home birth with a midwife.59  After more than a day of labor, she went to the 
hospital for fluids.60  Dr. Thompson told Ms. Pemberton that a cesarean section 
was needed, which she refused.61  The hospital refused to provide fluids, and 
Ms. Pemberton left.62  The hospital sought a court order to compel treatment, 
and a hearing occurred at the hospital.63  Additionally, the judge ordered Ms. 
Pemberton to appear at the hospital, and law enforcement forced her to return 
against her will.64  The hearing resulted in a court ordered cesarean section, 
which was then performed.65  Ms. Pemberton sued the hospital for violating her 
constitutional rights of bodily integrity, the right to refuse treatment, and the 
right to make important decisions about bearing children “without undue 
governmental interference.”66 
The court acknowledged Ms. Pemberton’s constitutional rights but 
determined that the state’s interest “in preserving the life of the unborn child” 
outweighed her rights.67  The court based its conclusions on Roe v. Wade,68 in 
which the Supreme Court “recognized the state’s interest in preserving a fetus 
as it progresses toward viability.”69  The Pemberton court based the 
imperativeness of the procedure on two rationales: the fetus’s imminent birth 
and the mother’s desire to avoid a specific procedure, not the birth itself.70  The 
 
 56. Id.  The court did not overrule In re Madyun, in which the court had compelled a cesarean 
section.  The concurrence agreed with this result, but advocated a balancing test because A.C.’s 
situation was different “from those other potential patients for medical procedures that will aid 
another person, for example, a potential donor of bone marrow for transplant.”  Id. at 1256 (Belson, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999). 
 58. Id. at 1249. 
 59. Id. Ms. Pemberton’s first pregnancy resulted in a vertical cesarean section, and vertical 
incisions are more likely to cause uterine rupture if vaginal delivery is attempted during subsequent 
pregnancies.  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1250. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1251. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 69. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. 
 70. Id. 
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risk of uterine rupture, which could have injured or killed Ms. Pemberton and 
her fetus, as well as the fact that “medicine is not an exact science,” tipped the 
balance in favor of a cesarean section.71 
ii. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority72 
The Georgia Supreme Court first considered the issue of compelled 
cesarean sections in 1981 and held that a woman could be compelled to have a 
cesarean section.  Ms. Jefferson went to Griffin Spalding County Hospital for 
prenatal treatment, where the hospital informed her that she had placenta 
previa.73  The doctor told Ms. Jefferson that a cesarean section was necessary to 
preserve her life, as well as her fetus.74  Ms. Jefferson refused the surgery, as well 
as blood transfusions, on religious grounds, and the hospital sought to 
determine whether the fetus “ha[d] any legal right to the protection of the 
Court.”75 
The Jefferson court also cited Roe in its analysis and held that a viable fetus 
merited state protection based on the Constitution and “statutes prohibiting the 
arbitrary termination of the life of an unborn fetus.”76  A Georgia criminal 
statute on abortion reinforced this belief, and, as a result, the Georgia Supreme 
Court found that the state’s duty to protect the fetus outweighed Ms. Jefferson’s 
refusal.77  The court determined that “the life of defendant and of the unborn 
child are, at the moment, inseparable, . . . [and deemed] it appropriate to 
infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it [was] necessary to give 
the child an opportunity to live.”78  Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered 
Ms. Jefferson to undergo a cesarean section. 
IV. REASONS SUPPORTING A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO REFUSE 
Four courts have addressed the issue of court ordered cesarean sections, 
but the judicial system has not yet reached a consensus.  States often try to 
obtain authority over the fetus through juvenile laws or child neglect statutes.79  
These statutes often contain language on parents and their omissions to provide 
 
 71. Id. at 1253-54.  The court, however, noted that if the case had not been “extraordinary and 
overwhelming,” then Ms. Pemberton, rather than the state, would have had the “right to decide.”  
Id. at 1254. 
 72. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam). 
 73. Id. at 458.  Placenta previa “is an abnormal implantation of the placenta at or near the 
internal opening of the uterine cervix so that it tends to precede the child at birth usually causing 
severe maternal hemorrhage.”  MEDLINE PLUS,  Medical Dictionary, Placenta Previa, MERRIAM 
WEBSTER, http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=placenta 
%20previa (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 74. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 77. Id. at 460. 
 78. Id. at 458.  While the concurring judge noted a possible jurisdictional issue involving the 
juvenile court and concerns about interfering with religious freedom, he believed that the risks 
merited intervention.  Id. at 460-62 (Hill, J., concurring). 
 79. See D.C. CODE § 4-1321.01 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(3)(a) (West 2006); GA. CODE 
ANN., § 49-5-180(5)(b) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(f) (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
39-15-401 to -402 (2003 & Supp. 2010).  
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medical treatment, and states use this language to argue that women have an 
obligation to provide medical treatment for their fetuses.80  Two courts have 
found the states’ arguments on this topic, in conjunction with other state 
interests, to prevail when a balancing test is used.81  Two other courts refused to 
use a balancing test and did not find these arguments persuasive enough to 
override the woman’s choice.82  Two arguments, however, exist for refusing a 
cesarean section and not using a balancing test to resolve the situation: a right to 
privacy and no duty to rescue another person. 
V. RIGHT TO REFUSE BASED ON A PERSON’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
A. Based on Abortion Law 
While the Constitution “does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,”83 
the Supreme Court has found that privacy rights exist in “specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights” by penumbras.84  These privacy rights encompass “the refusal 
of medical treatment, marriage, contraception, procreation, family relationships, 
and child rearing” and merit protection under various amendments.85  The 
Supreme Court has held that “the right of privacy is a fundamental personal 
right, emanating ‘from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we 
live.’”86  When judges decide on fundamentality, they “are not left at large to 
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.  Rather, they must 
look to the ‘traditions and (collective) conscience of our people’ to determine 
whether a principle is ‘so rooted (there) . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’”87 
The Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy even further with Roe v. 
Wade.  The Supreme Court extended the right to a woman’s decision 
surrounding an abortion, though this right was not absolute.88  States could limit 
a woman’s rights if a “compelling state interest” existed.89  The state’s interests 
encompassed the rights “in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical 
 
 80. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 852(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010) (“[A]ny parent . . . having 
custody or control of a child . . . who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary 
food, clothing, shelter, monetary child support, medical attendance . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 81. See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 
1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam). 
 82. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);  In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
 84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484, 484 (1965). 
 85. Eric M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold 
Question, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 256 (1994). 
 86. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 
(1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 87. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934)). 
 88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).  The Supreme Court stated, “The pregnant woman 
cannot be isolated in her privacy.  She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical 
definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.”  Id. at 159. 
 89. Id. at 156. 
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standards, and in protecting potential life.”90  Thus, states could regulate 
abortions when their interests became compelling, but not before that time. 
In Colautti v. Franklin,91 the Supreme Court limited the state’s regulation 
when the Court overturned a Pennsylvania statute that required a doctor to use 
“the abortion technique ‘which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus 
to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in 
order to preserve the life or health of the mother.’”92  When examining the 
statute, the Supreme Court focused on the statute’s use of the word necessary in 
the context of selecting techniques to perform abortions.93  The Court stated that 
the use of the word necessary implied “that a particular technique must be 
indispensable to the woman’s life or health—not merely desirable—before it 
may be adopted” when the doctor used an abortion technique which did not 
“provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive.”94  Thus, the 
doctor might engage in “a trade-off” between fetal survival and a woman’s 
health, which was undesirable.95  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the idea of no 
trade-offs between a woman’s health and her fetus’s survival in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.96  In this case, the Supreme 
Court noted that “no individual should be compelled to surrender the freedom 
to make [reproductive decisions] for herself simply because her ‘value 
preferences’ are not shared by the majority.”97 
While these cases expanded on Roe, they also called its holding into 
question, and the Supreme Court re-examined the abortion issue in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.98  The Supreme Court’s holding 
had three parts: a woman enjoyed a right to obtain an abortion without state 
interference before viability, the state held a right to restrict abortions after 
viability unless the woman’s health was in danger, and the state possessed 
legitimate interests in protecting the fetus’s life and the woman’s health.99  The 
Supreme Court, however, couched these rights in relation to a woman’s unique 
biological situation and reasoned, “the destiny of the woman must be shaped to 
a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place 
in society.”100  The Supreme Court noted that a state should not insist “upon its 
own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the 
 
 90. Id. at 154.  The Supreme Court, however, did not include the fetus in the definition of 
“person,” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and states could not limit abortion 
when it was “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother.”  Id. at 158, 164-65. 
 91. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
 92. Id. at 390 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (West 1977), invalidated by Colautti, 439 U.S. 379, 
401 (1979)). 
 93. Id. at 400. 
 94. Id. at 390. 
 95. Id. at 400-01. 
 96. 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 97. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 98. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 99. Id. at 846. 
 100. Id. at 852. 
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course of our history and our culture,” and the right to abortions has allowed 
women to achieve equality in American society.101  A state, however, can 
regulate abortions after viability and even provide information to ensure that 
the woman makes an informed choice.102  At the same time, the state’s decision 
to provide information cannot cause an “undue burden” on women.103  In spite 
of this new test, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to have an 
abortion, and found that a fetus was still not considered a person with a right to 
life under the Fourteenth Amendment.104 
i. Analysis of Refusal Based on Abortion Law 
Under Roe and its progeny, women enjoy a right to privacy in their 
reproductive decisions, though states can limit this right through their 
compelling interest in protecting potential life.  Some courts often use this 
limitation to compel a “pregnant woman to undergo treatment intended to 
benefit a viable fetus,” especially cesarean sections.105  The argument’s rationale 
depends on women’s reproductive rights not being absolute: because the rights 
are not absolute, and because the fetus could viably “live outside the womb,” 
the state invokes its compelling interest in protecting life.106  Thus, the state must 
balance the fetus’s viability against the only exception in post-viability abortion 
law—preservation of the life or health of the woman.  If the woman is not 
endangered, then some courts assert that she must undergo treatment to benefit 
the fetus and further the state’s compelling interest. 
This argument, however, misinterprets Roe and its progeny.107  First, Roe 
allows states to prohibit abortions after viability, but the case does not mention 
anything about compelling treatment “to promote fetal health.”108  Second, 
states cannot compel trade-offs between the woman and her fetus.109  If states 
cannot impose trade-offs for post-viability abortions, “then they must be 
unconstitutional for deliveries as well.”110  Doctors who pursue cesarean 
sections have “presumably determined that the risks to maternal life or health 
justify performing the cesarean section over vaginal delivery.”111  Thus, the 
fetus’s chances of survival improve if doctors perform a cesarean section.  The 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 872-75. 
 103. Id. at 877.  The Supreme Court adopted an “undue burden” test.  An undue burden occurs 
when “a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”  Id. 
 104. Id. at 913-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 158 (1973). 
 105. Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life, 
Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060, 1062 (1988). 
 106. Levy, supra note 20, at 102. 
 107. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979). 
 110. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1992 (1986). 
 111. Levine, supra note 85, at 261; see Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1192 (stating that doctors “are 
unlikely to seek court orders for surgery when there is only some indication that surgery would be 
preferable”). 
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woman’s chances of death or post-surgery complications, however, increase 
with cesarean sections as opposed to women who give birth vaginally.112  Thus, 
a trade-off occurs between the woman and the fetus, which violates the 
constitutional standards established in Colautti and reaffirmed in Thornburgh. 
Additionally, engaging in a trade-offs analysis places a value judgment on 
women.  States “assume that [women] owe this duty as a matter of course.  This 
assumption . . . appears to rest upon a conception of women’s role that has 
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.”113  This perception of 
women, however, is “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, 
the individual, or the Constitution.”114  Times have changed, and women are no 
longer in the kitchen barefoot and pregnant.  A balancing test causes the courts 
to engage in a trade-off between the woman and the fetus and shows the courts’ 
indifference to an “individual’s freedom to make such judgments.”115 
While most women would willingly make a trade-off for their fetuses, the 
courts should be “constitutionally barred from forcing [her] to undergo medical 
treatment for the sake of the fetus if that treatment endangers her life and health 
in any way.”116  States possess a compelling interest in potential life, but this 
interest does not imply that a trade-off must occur.  By engaging in a trade-off, 
the courts have determined that the woman’s risks are less than the fetus’s risks. 
Thus, based on a right to reproductive privacy, the courts should not apply 
a balancing test.  By making a trade-off between the woman’s rights and fetus’s 
rights, the courts violate the constitutional principles established in Roe and its 
progeny. 
B. Based on Informed Consent and Bodily Integrity 
Courts may honor a refusal of a cesarean section under a right to 
reproductive privacy, but a stronger justification is the right to refuse medical 
treatment based on informed consent and bodily integrity.  Pregnancy, however, 
is a conundrum in the legal and medical fields because by refusing treatment, 
the woman exercises her right of refusal, but the fetus never has an opportunity 
to refuse.  While this challenge does exist, the woman’s right to refuse stems 
from her right to privacy through informed consent, as well as bodily integrity, 
and outweighs the state’s four countervailing interests, which means that courts 
have no reason to use a balancing test. 
Any medical procedure requires the patient’s (or guardian’s) consent.  
Without consent, the doctor will commit an assault and a trespass on the patient 
regardless of the procedure’s success or failure.117  Consent is critical because 
society considers that “no right is more sacred or is more carefully guarded by 
 
 112. Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1992.  Some rare situations exist in which a vaginal delivery has 
as much risk as a cesarean delivery.  Id. 
 113. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 114. Id. at 897 (majority opinion). 
 115. Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062. 
 117. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing v. 
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
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the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control 
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear 
and unquestionable authority of law.”118  The idea of bodily integrity helped to 
develop the informed consent doctrine because “every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to her own 
body.”119  Thus, doctors could only operate with patient consent unless an 
emergency arose with an unconscious patient that required a necessary 
operation.120  While “general consent” was sufficient early on, courts began to 
require that doctors inform their patients of surgery’s risks, possible outcomes, 
and necessary follow-ups if these factors materially affected the patient’s 
decision.121  Patients generally lack medical training, and, to make the right 
decision, they must understand the important issues related to treatment.122  
Thus, doctors became liable if they did not disclose these issues regarding the 
impending procedure to their patients. 
In the seminal case Canterbury v. Spence,123 the United States Court of 
Appeals in the District of Columbia shaped the informed consent doctrine.  In 
this case, a young man consented to surgery on a ruptured disc.124  The surgery 
appeared uneventful, but the man fell out of bed, which resulted in 
complications,125 and the patient suffered paralysis below the waist.126  The 
operation had a one percent chance of paralysis, which the patient was unaware 
of prior to surgery.127  The patient believed that the doctor should have informed 
him of this risk because it would have affected his decision.128  The court held 
that the doctor had a duty to inform the patient about the treatment’s risks if 
they materially affected the patient’s decision.129  With this standard, informed 
consent “has become firmly entrenched in American tort law” and indicates the 
importance of respect for patient autonomy, even if the doctor considers the 
decision ridiculous or neurotic.130 
While informed consent provides patients with information to decide 
whether to pursue the treatment, a corollary to this right exists.  If patients have 
a choice about consenting to a procedure, then “the patient generally possesses 
the right to not consent . . . to refuse treatment.”131  This right to refuse medical 
treatment has a basis in “a constitutional right of privacy,” which encompasses 
Fourteenth Amendment issues, and a “common law right to self determination 
 
 118. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 119. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 122. See Levine, supra note 85, at 272. 
 123. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 124. Id. at 777. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 778. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 787. 
 130. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see Rhoden, supra 
note 110, at 1970. 
 131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. 
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and informed consent.”132  Thus, people may refuse medical treatment even if 
the decision results in their deaths.133  Even if medical technology could restore a 
person to perfect health, the courts generally abide by the patient’s decision.134 
While the right to refuse medical treatment “has come to be widely 
recognized and respected by the courts of the nation,” this right, like women’s 
abortion rights, is not absolute.135  States possess interests that counter the 
patient’s right to refuse treatment: “the preservation of life, the protection of the 
interests of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the 
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”136  Pregnancy, 
however, creates a unique quandary with refusal of treatment: can a pregnant 
woman refuse treatment even if the fetus could suffer harm?  Supporters of 
court ordered cesarean sections argue that the four countervailing state interests 
outweigh the rights of self-determination, informed consent, and bodily 
integrity.  This argument, however, fails to overcome these long established 
rights of every free person in the United States. 
i. The Four State Factors 
1. Preservation of Life 
First, the preservation of life is often considered the most important state 
interest, and the state may “assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of 
human life.”137  This interest is very compelling when the person’s life “can be 
saved where the affliction is curable,” but the state must acknowledge “an 
individual’s right to avoid circumstances in which the individual . . . would feel 
that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade [her] humanity.”138  While courts 
recognize that the refusal of treatment involves a person’s quality of life and 
should be left to the patient, they often examine other factors like recovery 
chances, the treatment’s invasiveness, and “the patient’s desires and experience 
of pain and enjoyment.”139  When a person can regain good health through a 
minimally invasive procedure, like a blood transfusion, the preservation of life 
interest becomes more compelling.140  Despite the increased value, courts have 
upheld a patient’s decision to refuse a minimally invasive and possibly life 
saving treatment.141 
 
 132. Id. at 272. 
 133. Id. at 273. 
 134. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972) (upholding a Jehovah’s Witness’s decision to 
refuse a potentially life-saving blood transfusion). 
 135. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); see Cruzan, 497 U.S 
at 270. 
 136. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
 137. Id. at 282. 
 138. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 635. 
 139. Id. at 635-36. (stating that the wife of a man in a persistent vegetative state could have her 
husband’s feeding tube removed and discontinue his artificial means of survival). 
 140. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (1964) (per 
curiam) (holding that hospitals may administer blood transfusions if necessary to save a woman’s 
life or the life of her child). 
 141. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972). 
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If the procedure’s invasiveness increases and requires surgery, then the 
state’s interest becomes less compelling as the patient’s autonomy is infringed.  
Courts are less willing to override a patient’s decision if “the procedure may 
threaten the safety or health of the individual.”142  In Winston v. Lee,143 the 
Supreme Court refused to compel a surgery to remove a bullet for evidence 
because of the surgery’s risks to the suspect.144  The concerns over a surgery’s 
risks also occur in pregnancy cases.  A Massachusetts court refused to compel a 
woman to undergo a purse string operation during her pregnancy, which would 
have required suturing the woman’s cervix to ensure that it “[would] hold the 
pregnancy.”145  The state had not proven whether the operation was necessary, 
whether the pregnancy could not be carried to term without the procedure, and 
what the risks of impact on the woman were.146  These types of concerns affect 
the court’s view of whether an invasive medical procedure helps or hurts the 
state’s preservation of life argument. 
a. Analysis of the Preservation of Life 
Cesarean sections support the state’s preservation of life argument because 
the outcome generally results in a success for all parties, but success is not 
enough.  Cesarean sections may improve the fetus’s chance to be restored to full 
health, but the procedure, with its increased morbidity and mortality rates, 
actually places the woman’s life at risk.147  The woman has a greater chance of 
dying with a cesarean section, which implies that the state is gambling with the 
woman’s life.  The state claims a desire to preserve the lives of both parties, but 
it places the woman, who is likely a productive member of society, at risk for the 
chance that the fetus will become a productive member of society.  The state’s 
logic contains flaws and appears counterintuitive. 
Additionally, a cesarean section is incredibly invasive for a woman.  The 
doctor cuts through several layers of tissue and enters her body to remove the 
fetus.148  This level of invasiveness surpasses the level that the Supreme Court 
has considered unacceptable.149  The invasiveness and number of incisions 
required in a cesarean section also increase the woman’s chances for infection, 
which places her life at risk again.150  Thus, the state’s interest in preserving life 
appears unmet by compelling a woman to undergo a cesarean section.  While 
the state may preserve the fetus’s life, the woman’s life may not be saved, which 
 
 142. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). 
 143. 470 U.S. at 753. 
 144. Id. at 764-65. (referring to the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to compel the surgery because “the 
greater intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infection”). 
 145. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396-97 (Mass. 1983). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Part II. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 764 (suggesting that surgery to remove a bullet without the patient’s 
consent was an intrusion of personal privacy and integrity as it would require probing the muscle 
tissue and could result in damage to the muscles and nerves); Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 397 (holding that a 
purse string operation may unjustifiably restrict a woman’s constitutional right to privacy as it 
would involve surgery to suture her cervix to hold the pregnancy). 
 150. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 764; supra Part II. 
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appears to defeat the state’s overall goal.  This interest, however, usually 
involves only one patient, not two, and to address the situation fully, this 
argument must consider the protection of innocent third parties. 
2. Protection of Innocent Third Parties 
Second, the state has an interest in the protection of innocent third parties.  
This interest may not have the most significance in right to refuse cases, but in 
cesarean sections cases, it acquires pertinence because the woman determines 
the fetus’s fate as well as her own.  Courts often cite this factor in overriding a 
patient’s refusal if the patient already has minor children.151  In these situations, 
the state’s main concern involves the child’s emotional well-being to have two 
parents.152  Additionally, the state has concerns about children becoming a 
burden to the state.153  Courts believe that parents should not be permitted “to 
abandon a child” and that parents have “a responsibility to the community to 
care” for their children.154  If the courts think that extended family and financial 
planning adequately meet these factors, then they will likely uphold a patient’s 
decision. 
a. Analysis of the Protection of Innocent Third Parties 
This argument is strong, but it still does not override the woman’s right to 
refuse because it applies to children already born.  As stated earlier, courts do 
not consider fetuses, unlike children already born, to be people under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.155  Courts considered situations that involved 
protecting already born children from abandonment.156  Fetuses should not 
receive an unfair expansion of their rights over a grown woman’s rights when 
the fetuses have not merited those protections yet.157  The fetus may not survive 
childbirth or may be stillborn, which means that the doctor cut open the 
woman’s body for no reason.  Additionally, these cases and courts have focused 
mainly on whether the child might be abandoned and become a burden to the 
state.158  A woman’s refusal of a cesarean section, however, may not necessarily 
result in the fetus becoming a ward of the state.  The woman may deliver 
naturally with no complications.159  The fetus could die during or prior to 
childbirth, or because of the compelled procedure the woman and fetus could 
 
 151. See In re President & Dir. of Georgetown Coll., Inc. (In re Georgetown), 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 
(D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 824-25 
(Fla. 1994); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
 152. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 826. 
 153. See Osborne, 294 A.2d at 374; Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 827 n.12 (noting that the state’s only 
concern was “that the children would be cared for and would not be a burden on the State” when 
their mother refused a blood transfusion). 
 154. Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008. 
 155. See supra Part V.A. 
 156. See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008; Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
 157. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 158. See  Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008; Osborne, 294 A.2d at 374; Dubreil, 629 So. 2d 819, 825 (Fla. 
1994) (citing Wons v. Pub. Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 159. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that the mother 
delivered the fetus naturally before the court resolved the proceedings). 
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die on the operating table.  In all of these situations, the fetus does not become a 
ward of the state.  The fetus, however, has a greater chance of becoming a ward 
of the state because of the cesarean section’s increased morbidity and mortality 
rates to the woman during and after surgery.160  Thus, the state preserves the 
fetus’s life by a cesarean section, but the state does not protect all of the fetus’s 
interests.  The woman could die from the cesarean section, which could cause 
the fetus to become a ward of the state and deprives the fetus of having two 
parents.  Like the state’s preservation of life argument, this argument could still 
lead, ironically, to the fetus becoming a ward of the state or having one or no 
parents, which completely defeats the state’s overall goal. 
3. Prevention of Suicide 
Third, the prevention of suicide is a weak argument.  By refusing a “life 
sustaining treatment,” courts should not view a patient as “attempt[ing] to 
commit suicide.”161  This rationale works for two reasons.  First, even if the 
refusal results in death, the death would be due to “the underlying disease, and 
not the result of a self inflicted injury.”162  Second, a person may wish to live but 
without the specific treatment.163  Neither of these reasons fit the concept of 
suicide.  Suicide is defined as “taking one’s life,” the act is intentionally done, 
and the person often lacks the will to live.164  These factors, however, can be 
misconstrued in a woman’s refusal and used as a way to circumvent her refusal. 
a. Analysis of Prevention of Suicide 
If a woman refuses a cesarean section, she is not trying to commit suicide.  
She, like a Jehovah’s Witness refusing blood, chooses a different path from the 
one that doctors prefer.  This choice may increase her chances of dying, but the 
situation may unfold with no complications and without the undesired 
treatment.165  She is not intentionally killing herself.  Additionally, a woman 
who carries a pregnancy to term seems like an unlikely candidate for suicide.  If 
she were suicidal, why would she go to the hospital?  She could stay home and 
do nothing.  Plus, most women would not give birth and abandon the child with 
their deaths. 
Finally, living in the technologically advanced twenty-first century, a 
woman has more than one delivery option, which itself implies a choice.  If she 
lived during the sixteenth century, then she would have had no other option 
than to give birth vaginally until the fetus was born, or she died, which would 
then result in a cesarean section.  Now, the woman who refuses a cesarean 
section merely allows nature to take its course, which is not the same as 
imposing an intentional, self-inflicted injury.  While some might fail to 
 
 160. See supra Part II. 
 161. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (The patient, a Jehovah’s Witness, 
stated, “I wish to live, but with no blood transfusions.”). 
 164. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004); see In re Georgetown, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 
(D.C. Cir. 1964). 
 165. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that the mother delivered 
the fetus naturally before the court could determine if a compelled cesarean section was necessary). 
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understand her decision or view it as irrational, the decision is hers to make as 
an autonomous individual.  The state’s suicide argument is weak because the 
refusal, while an intentional choice, is not a self-inflicted injury.  Also, the 
woman may not die from her refusal, which obliterates the factor of taking one’s 
life because death is not guaranteed.  The state’s argument on this interest 
appears so incredulous because a woman, who likely nurtured and cared for the 
fetus until delivery, does not mesh with society’s vision of a suicidal person. 
4. Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession 
Finally, the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession 
does not support the pro-fetus camp.  Courts generally do not require doctors or 
hospitals to violate their moral or ethical principles and do allow them to refuse 
to withhold “treatment if they believe that it will cause the patient’s death.”166  
Thus, if the doctors do not want to perform a court ordered cesarean section due 
to the belief that it will cause the patient’s death, they do not have to perform 
the procedure.  This scenario, however, will likely not occur because doctors 
often seek court approval for the procedure. 
Professional societies, however, have taken a stance on the issue and 
“suggest that doctors accede to the patients’ and families’ needs and 
wishes . . . .”167  In fact, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) and the American Medical Association (AMA) believe that the final 
decision on cesarean sections belongs to the woman.168  The ACOG states: 
Once a patient has been informed of the material risks and benefits involved 
with a treatment, test, or procedure, that patient has the right to exercise full 
autonomy in deciding whether to undergo the treatment, test, or procedure, or 
whether to make a choice among a variety of treatments, tests or procedures.  In 
the exercise of that autonomy, the informed patient also has the right to refuse 
to undergo any of these treatments, tests, or procedures. . . . Such a refusal [of 
consent] may be based on religious beliefs, personal preference, or comfort.169 
Although some doctors disagree with the ACOG’s perspective, the ACOG 
and AMA’s statements undermine the state’s argument “that professional 
integrity supports compulsory treatment.”170 
a. Analysis of Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the 
                                Medical Profession 
If the woman refuses treatment, the doctor must abide by her decision.  
Ethically, the patient’s decision binds the doctors, which the ACOG’s committee 
opinion supports.  Doctors may not agree with the decision ethically or morally, 
but unless they want to commit a battery or disrespect a patient’s wishes by 
obtaining a court order, they must accept the decision.  Additionally, courts 
 
 166. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 632, 639. 
 167. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 88. 
 168. See LYNN M. PALTROW, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, COERCIVE MEDICINE 
(2004), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/Coercive_Medicine.pdf. 
 169. Id. (quoting AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, INFORMED REFUSAL, Op. No. 
237 (2000)). 
 170. Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1972. 
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should realize that by granting a court order, they act counter to the medical 
community’s standards, which were promulgated for the doctors’ benefit.171 
Courts must consider the ethical implications of compelling the cesarean 
section due to the doctors’ ethical obligation to honor the patient’s wishes and to 
do no harm.  By forcing a woman to undergo a cesarean section, the doctors, 
with court approval, violate this oath.  The doctors inflict mental, as well as 
physical harm, on the woman by disregarding her wishes, cutting her open, and 
removing her fetus in an undesired manner.  Thus, courts must maintain the 
doctors’ ethical integrity by upholding the woman’s right to refuse treatment.  
The ACOG’s standards and the Hippocratic Oath derail the state’s argument 
that the profession’s integrity supports mandated treatment. 
Taking all of these factors together, the state’s interests do not outweigh a 
woman’s right to refuse medical treatment.  Once a doctor fully informs the 
woman of the surgery’s benefits and the risks of refusal, the doctors and courts 
should abide by her decision.  Courts should not use a balancing test that 
weighs her privacy rights against the fetus’s rights.  Her right to privacy based 
on informed consent and bodily integrity trump the state’s countervailing 
interests. 
VI. RIGHT TO REFUSE BASED ON NO DUTY TO RESCUE ANOTHER 
Besides a right to refuse based on the right to privacy, women also have an 
argument involving the common law idea of no duty to rescue another person 
and equal protection under the law.  This argument refutes claims that pregnant 
women have a duty to rescue their fetuses.  Any “rescue obligation” violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment and perpetuates a paternalistic society. 
A persistent idea in American law is that one does not have a duty to 
rescue another person.172  While early contemplations of the law considered 
active and passive roles in the risk separately, the law now considers these roles 
together.173  The overall idea, however, has not changed: “an actor whose 
conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to 
the other” unless a court determines that an “affirmative” duty exists.174  Thus, a 
person has “no duty of care when another is at risk for reasons other than the 
conduct of the actor, even though the actor may be in a position to help . . . .”175 
This idea, however, is qualified by the existence of special relationships, 
which establish an affirmative duty to act.176  These relationships range from 
innkeepers and guests; landlords and tenants; and common carriers and 
passengers.177  The exception also encompasses custodians who are “required by 
law to take custody . . . of the other” and “[have] a superior ability to protect the 
 
 171. See PALTROW, supra note 168. 
 172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
 173. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS HARM § 37 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 6, 2005). 
 174. Id. § 37. 
 175. Id. § 37 cmt. b. 
 176. Id. § 40(a) (“An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of 
reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.”). 
 177. See id. § 40(b). 
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other.”178  Parents and their dependent children belong in the custodian 
exception.179  Thus, parents usually have a duty to rescue their children.  
Without a special relationship, a person generally has no duty to rescue another 
because this country has a tradition of siding with individual freedom and 
autonomy.180 
While people do not have a duty to rescue others, they try to compel rescue 
in certain contexts, like organ donation and bone marrow.  In McFall v. Shimp,181 
Mr. McFall had a bone marrow disease, and without a transplant, he would 
die.182  Mr. Shimp matched Mr. McFall as a donor, but he refused to donate.183  
The Pennsylvania court acknowledged that the common law provided “that one 
human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save 
another human being or to rescue.”184  The court also noted that society 
respected a person and wanted to prevent an “individual from being invaded 
and hurt by another.”185  The court held that Mr. Shimp could not be compelled 
“to submit to an intrusion of his body” because it “would defeat the sanctity of 
the individual and would impose a rule which would know no limits . . . .”186  
While the court thought that Mr. Shimp’s choice contained moral flaws, it 
analogized a forced procedure to Nazism and the Inquisition.187 
While that situation involved two adults with no special relationship, the 
courts have also not compelled a rescue in situations involving siblings or 
natural fathers.  In the case of In re Richardson,188 Roy was a seventeen-year-old 
mentally disabled boy, and his sister needed a kidney transplant.189  After the 
entire family underwent testing, Roy was deemed the best match.190  The father 
wanted authorization for the procedure, but the court held that Roy had a “right 
to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ 
unless such loss to be in the best interest of the minor.”191  Thus, he had no 
obligation to rescue his sister. 
While dialysis provided an alternative in Richardson, bone marrow 
situations are trickier, but courts have still upheld a family member’s refusal not 
 
 178. See id. § 40(b)(7)(a)-(b). 
 179. See id. § 40 cmt. n. 
 180. See id. § 40 cmt. o (noting that the special relationships list is not exclusive, and courts may 
add exceptions in some situations, especially with other family members). 
 181. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978). 
 182. Id. at 90. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 91. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 92.  The court used vivid language to reinforce its point:  “For a society which respects 
the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and 
suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of 
jurisprudence.”  Id. 
 188. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
 189. Id. at 186. 
 190. Id. at 187. 
 191. Id. The court also noted and considered that the sister could survive with renal dialysis for 
an indefinite period of time.  Id. at 186. 
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to rescue another person.  In the case of In re George,192 the son, who had been 
adopted, suffered from leukemia.193  He could stay alive on drugs temporarily, 
but to survive, he needed a bone marrow transplant.194  He sought information 
on his natural father to determine if he was a possible match.195  Despite the 
court’s attempts to convince the natural father to consent to testing, he refused, 
regardless of the court’s offers of anonymity.196  The son argued that the trial 
court abused its discretion, but the Missouri Court of Appeals thought that the 
son’s need, along with the satisfaction of his need and the father’s cooperation, 
merited consideration.197  The court ruled that his situation did not merit the 
adoption records to be unsealed, which implied that the natural father had no 
duty to rescue his son.198 
A. Analysis of No Duty to Rescue 
Cesarean sections have similar levels of need and intrusion as organ or 
bone marrow donations.  The doctors and courts, however, rationalize the first 
procedure differently from the latter procedures.  The women want to give 
birth, but they do not want to undergo the particular delivery procedure, 
whereas people who refuse to donate an organ or bone marrow want nothing to 
do with the whole situation.199  The doctors and courts rationalize that refusing a 
particular delivery method is not as significant or intrusive as refusing an organ 
donation.  Overriding the decision is only a minor detail for them.  This 
rationalization, however, reeks of paternalism and treats women as if they made 
a hysterical decision during labor.  The people noted in the above cases appear 
to have more control over their rights in the doctors’ and courts’ minds on 
whether to rescue someone than a woman who refuses a cesarean section. 
Additionally, many contend that pregnant women have a “special 
relationship” with their fetuses, which vitiates the no duty to rescue rule.  They 
base this argument on the biological fact that what happens to the woman 
affects the fetus.  They contend that a woman has certain obligations and is 
compelled to “protect [the fetus] in [her] charge from risks posed by third 
persons,” which in this situation would be herself.200  To reinforce this point, 
some people argue that women who do not undergo abortions waive their 
rights to refuse medical procedures, like a cesarean section, that aid the fetus.201  
Thus, a woman must provide her fetus “with such things as ‘necessary medical 
attendance.’”202 
 
 192. 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
 193. Id. at 615. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 616. 
 196. Id. at 616-17.  The “father” claimed that he was not the natural father.  Id. at 616. 
 197. Id. at 622-23. 
 198. Id. at 623. 
 199. See Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1979. 
 200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173, § 40 cmt. n. 
 201. See Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1979. 
 202. George J. Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13 (1986). 
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This special relationship argument has some merit, but it does not override 
a woman’s decision.  First, women have a “right to bear children,” and no 
waiver of that right ever occurs.203  Second, comparing the parent and child 
category to the woman and fetus stretches the Fourteenth Amendment.  A child 
is a person, but under the Fourteenth Amendment, the fetus is not considered a 
person, which implies that the custodian special relationship does not apply to 
pregnant women unless courts expand the list.204  Third, while parents have an 
obligation to act in their children’s best interests, these interests do not infringe 
on their bodily integrity.205  Parents do not have to sacrifice their lives or organs 
for their children even though they likely would if the situation required it.  
With a pregnant woman, the doctor must infringe on the woman’s bodily 
integrity to rescue the fetus, which “degrades and dehumanizes the mother and 
treats her as an inert container.”206  Finally, the special relationship applies only 
to women.  Courts do not compel fathers, siblings, or other family members to 
infringe on their bodily integrity and save family members.207  Courts could 
extend the special relationship standard beyond parent and child, but the courts 
have chosen to maintain the standard.208  Thus, courts have created a double 
standard between men and women involving their bodily integrity rights and 
aiding their children.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts cannot “deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”209  Courts 
do not compel fathers to infringe on their bodily integrity to save their 
children.210  By forcing women to undergo cesarean sections, the courts reinforce 
stereotypical gender roles, relegating the woman to the kitchen, barefoot and 
pregnant, and violating her equal protection rights.  Until the courts require 
both parents to surrender their bodily integrity rights to aid their children, 
women should not be compelled to give up their rights to refuse treatment 
based on a special relationship argument. 
If courts treat women as “mere means” to delivering a fetus based on their 
special relationship, which fathers do not have, then Margaret Atwood’s 
cautionary tale, The Handmaid’s Tale, becomes more likely.211  The Handmaid’s 
Tale involves a society in which only some women reproduce, and society 
considers reproduction as their job.212  To avoid this mindset, the “special 
 
 203. Id. at 14. 
 204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173,  § 
40 cmt. o. 
 205. George J. Annas, She’s Going to Die: The Case of Angela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 24 
(1988). 
 206. Id. at 24. 
 207. William Ruddick & William Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 12 
(1982); see In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 623 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978). 
 208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173, § 40 cmt. o. 
 209. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 210. See, e.g., In re George, 630 S.W.2d at 622-23 (holding that adoption records that would 
presumably identify a son’s biological father could not be unsealed based solely on the son’s medical 
need). 
 211. Frank. A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Justified Limits on Refusing Intervention, 21 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12, 12 (1991); see Annas, supra note 202, at 13. 
 212. Annas, supra note 202, at 13. 
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relationship” exception should not apply to pregnant women because of gender 
discrimination and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
VII.  ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR CESAREAN CASES 
Given all of this information, the Illinois Appellate Court reached the right 
result with In re Baby Boy Doe.  The court refused to use a balancing test because 
the “woman’s competent choice” trumped the state’s rights.213  The court 
acknowledged her right to refuse treatment, the uniqueness of her situation, and 
her constitutional rights.214  In the case of In re A.C., the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals also reached the correct result by honoring a woman’s refusal, 
but the decision depended on informed consent and bodily integrity.215  The 
court, however, thought that a “truly extraordinary” situation for overriding the 
woman’s decision could occur.  While an extreme, inconceivable situation could 
arise, the courts should not leave the situation undefined.  Without a standard, a 
slippery slope exists, which could eventually encroach on the woman’s decision 
and place the court back in the same quandary that existed with In re A.C.216 
The Jefferson and Pemberton courts, however, employed paternalistic 
approaches.  Both courts used Roe and its compelling interests’ concept to 
support their decisions.217  As stated earlier, Roe does not pertain to compelling 
medical treatments for fetuses but to abortions.218  Second, these courts required 
women to endure trade-offs.  Women would be forced to undergo an unwanted 
surgical procedure for their fetuses.  The procedure increased their chances of 
morbidity and mortality, because it benefited the fetus.219  Finally, these courts 
likely engaged in value judgments on the situations.  Ms. Jefferson and Ms. 
Pemberton wanted natural births.  The courts may have implicitly or directly 
considered the idea that “the woman commits herself to obedience and maternal 
devotion; she agrees to sacrifice any distinct self interest for the sake of her 
child . . . .”220  Regardless, the Jefferson and Pemberton courts felt that the state’s 
interests outweighed the women’s choices, and these decisions were likely based 
the idea that the state possesses an overwhelming interest to preserve all life.  
While determining how personal perspectives may affect courts’ decisions is 
difficult, a balancing analysis could unconsciously cause the courts’ personal 
views to influence the decision.  These courts misinterpreted well-established 
ideas of informed consent, bodily integrity, abortion, and no duty to rescue by 
misapplying Roe and using a balancing test to order cesarean sections. 
 
 213. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 214. See generally id. 
 215. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1242 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251-52 (N.D. 
Fla. 1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (per 
curiam). 
 218. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062. 
 219. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986), 
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 400-01 (1979); Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1992. 
 220. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 207, at 12. 
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VIII.  SOLUTIONS TO THE COURT ORDERED CESAREAN SECTION 
Court ordered cesarean sections come up infrequently in the courts, but 
when the situation occurs, it occurs in the worst possible way.  The decision-
making time is often limited and the doctors face a pressing deadline.  Parents 
are unprepared to defend their position and the courts lack the time to analyze 
the law and issue properly.  While the best solution would be for the Supreme 
Court to address the issue, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will receive and 
accept a petition on this issue.  The reason that a case may never reach that level 
of review is because only four recorded cases have reached the appellate level.  
Thus, unless there is an increase in the number of cases heard in appellate courts 
and a circuit split develops, the Supreme Court may not see the need to address 
this issue.  In lieu of Supreme Court resolution, the hospitals, patients, and 
doctors must establish other methods that could prevent judicial intervention. 
First, the hospital could accept the woman’s refusal and not perform a 
cesarean section.  As long as the women appear competent and fully informed 
of the risks of refusing treatment, doctors fulfill their ethical duty.  This idea, 
however, might conflict with a doctor’s desire to save the fetus, but the decision 
belongs to the woman. 
Second, doctors could receive more training in alternative delivery 
methods like VBAC, vaginal breech delivery, or delivery by forceps.221  Doctors 
frequently perform cesarean sections because they learned the procedure in 
medical school and often lack experience in other methods.222  At the slightest 
sign of trouble, doctors usually opt for a cesarean section, which may conflict 
with the woman’s wishes.  With training in alternative delivery methods, 
doctors could deliver the fetus safely and comply with the woman’s wishes. 
Third, doctors perform cesarean sections to avoid malpractice suits, and by 
performing a cesarean section, the doctors can prove that they complied with 
the standard of care.223  If malpractice claims were reduced through tort reform, 
then the number of cesarean sections performed would likely decrease.  Even 
with a woman’s consent, doctors might still have liability concerns.  If a woman 
gives informed consent for her cesarean section refusal, then she likely has no 
legal case against the doctor, and lawsuits brought by the father or child should 
also fail.224  Doctors, however, think that compelling a cesarean section will 
reduce, if not absolve, their possible liability issues.225  While this rationale is 
misguided, the legal field needs to address the doctors’ liability concerns.  With 
reform, the doctors can focus on the best course of treatment in compliance with 
the patient’s wishes rather than the possibility of a lawsuit.226 
 
 221. Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 143. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See generally ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 108-09 (stating that doctors often perform 
cesarean sections as defensive medicine to show that they did everything possible). 
 224. Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1063. 
 225. See id. 
 226. In addition to reducing liability, hospitals must equalize the costs of vaginal births and 
cesarean sections.  Cesarean sections are more expensive than vaginal births, and these excess costs 
are covered by insurance.  Unless changes are made, profit-focused doctors will be more likely to 
use cesarean sections.  ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 53. 
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Finally, the doctor and patient must discuss these issues earlier in the 
pregnancy.  The doctor needs to know about the woman’s views on childbirth 
because the doctor will need to present her with the available options and risks 
of each choice.  The woman then has time to research these options and ask 
questions.  If they do not discuss their views and options, then a court ordered 
intervention could result, which destroys the doctor-patient relationship and 
trust.227  The relationship will change from a joint venture for the best possible 
outcome into a hostile relationship.228  By discussing the issues earlier, the 
woman can decide whether their views mesh, or whether she needs to search for 
a new doctor.  Additionally, the discussion prevents any last minute chaos and 
confusion that a birth, especially a problematic one, can create.  Discussion 
prevents the doctor and the woman from becoming enemies during the most 
important time of the relationship—the delivery. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Court ordered cesarean sections happen infrequently, but they can occur.  
Because of their infrequency, courts have reached different results on the issue.  
In these situations, however, courts should honor the woman’s wishes and not 
use a balancing test.  By using a balancing test, the woman becomes nothing 
more than a shell protecting the fetus until birth.  Women have come a long way 
since the image of a docile, subservient woman and have the same legal rights as 
men in this country.  A balancing test, however, causes the courts to sweep aside 
the woman’s rights and places her firmly in the Middle Ages, when the cesarean 
section was a last resort.  While doctors face a quandary about who to treat with 
a pregnant patient, they, as well as the courts, should honor the woman’s 
decision.  By acting contrary to her decision, the woman’s constitutional rights 
are violated, and she is placed back in the kitchen, barefoot and pregnant.  
Courts should not presume to know what is best for the woman.  Thus, they 
should abide by the woman’s informed refusal of a cesarean section and not use 
a balancing test, which could result in a trade off between her rights and the 
fetus’s rights. 
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